This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: "engineering," which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and "law", which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of...

This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: "engineering," which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and "law," which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of...

This paper considers the allocation of two types of individuals differentiated by levels of talent within and between two countries when they choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. The equilibrium with international migrations requires both countries to be sufficiently different in talent...

We ask what level of migration would maximize world welfare. We find that skill-neutral policies are never optimal. An egalitarian welfare function induces a policy that entails moving mainly unskilled immigrants into the rich countries, whereas a welfare function skewed highly towards the rich...

We ask what level of migration would maximize world welfare. We find that skill-neutral policies are never optimal. An egalitarian welfare function induces a policy that entails moving mainly unskilled immigrants into the rich countries, whereas a welfare function skewed highly towards the rich...

The paper shows that in a reasonable production structure for a developing economy a brain drain of skilled labour may raise the welfare of the economy while an emigration of unskilled labour is welfare reducing. Also an emigration of skilled / unskilled labour lowers the urban unemployment of...