We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others'. The choice of the mechanism generates informational incentives as it affects what information is acquired before play begins. A mechanism is informationally simple if...

II address the way agency incentives evolve, from listed equity with low liquidity to highly liquid stocks with active informed speculators. I conclude that, as the informativeness of stock price about the manager's actions improves, less weight needs to be given to both equity and non-price...

Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex ante search problem, and adverse selection and moral hazard ex post. We fully characterise the equilibrium for quasi linear preferences, and derive some comparative statics. If...

The paper studies incentives of low-quality sellers to disclose negative information about their product. We develop a model where one's quality can be communicated via cheap-talk messages only. This setting limits ability of high-quality sellers to separate as any communication strategy they...

We examine information aggregation regarding industry capital productivity from privately informed managers in a dynamic model with optimal incentive contracts. Information cascades always occur if managers enjoy limited liability: when beliefs regarding productivity become endogenously extreme...

We consider a platform in which multiple sellers offer their products for sale over a time horizon of T periods. Each seller sets its own price. The platform collects a fraction of the sales revenue and provides price-setting incentives to the sellers to maximize its own revenue. The demand for...

We propose a family of incentive contracts that can attract some fund managers who are favored by investors and deter any manager who is unfavorable to some investors. The contract problem has hidden types, hidden actions, hidden knowledge of preferences, and opportunity cost. In contrast to...

Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher...