. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incen­tives …

incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to grading exams. Our main conclusion is that if students care … are disparate, the optimal wage schedule creates different grades than we found with status incentives alone. The very top … status grades are optimal as we found with status incentives alone. A bonus is paid only to scores in the top status grade …

that professionals show higher levels of intrinsic (self-image) incentives to outperform others compared to non …-professionals (students), but a similar behavior can be sparked among the latter by adding reputational incentives. …

that professionals show higher levels of intrinsic (self-image) incentives to outperform others compared to non …-professionals (students), but a similar behavior can be sparked among the latter by adding reputational incentives. …