The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value …. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the … procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare ?xed-prize tournaments with and …

suppliers. We also compare other common contests, in particular, fixed-prize tournaments and auctions. Like bonus tournaments …This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …, auctions implement the socially optimal diversity, but usually with higher rents for the suppliers. Fixed-prize tournaments …

This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research … institutions, such as scoring auctions and fixed-prize tournaments. … option value. We show that suitable contests can induce such variety. The optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where …

This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …, we compare the optimal contest to scoring auctions and fixed-prize tournaments. … suitable contests can induce such variety. The buyer-optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where suppliers can choose only …

This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …

combine the best aspects of innovation races and research tournaments. …This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We …

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for … admission to an innovation contest. After the contest, an innovation is procured employing either a fixed prize or a first …