This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his...

Several studies have shown that people greatly discount future benefits and costs, but few have examined how discounting is manifested in strategic settings. This paper investigates the degree to which the timing of payments affects behavior in four commonly studied strategic settings: a...

This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle, while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately...

Optimal bidding strategies in first-price and Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic but depend on bidder risk attitudes. However, laboratory experiments consistently find different behaviour between auction formats. This article explores whether the notion in psychology that financial and...

Previous studies have demonstrated that a multitude of options can lead to choice overload, reducing decision quality. Through controlled experiments, we examine sequential choice architectures that enable the choice set to remain large while potentially reducing the effect of choice overload. A...

This paper considers a contest setting in which a challenger chooses between one of two contests to enter after observing the level of defense at each. Despite the challenger’s chance of success being determined by a proportional contest success function, the defenders effectively find...

Risk aversion (a second‐order risk preference) is a time‐proven concept in economic models of choice under risk. More recently, the higher order risk preferences of prudence (third‐order) and temperance (fourth‐order) also have been shown to be quite important. While a majority of the...

Economists have noted the empirical regularity that an individual's attitude towards risk is not constant across elicitation settings. Such a pattern is conceptually consistent with the argument in psychology that risk is domain specific. To explore this view, we frame a common risk elicitation...