Book chapter without abstract

We derive conditions under which cost-increasing measures -- consistent with either regulatory constraints or fully expropriated taxes -- can increase the profits of all agents active within a common-pool resource. This somewhat counterintuitive result is possible regardless of whether price is...

We derive several comparative-static results for Cournot games when firms have nonconstant marginal-cost curves which shift exogenously. The results permit us to rank certain vectors of equilibrium marginal costs with the same component sum according to their associated social surplus or...

In markets for many fruits, vegetables, and an increasing number of imported goods, consumers cannot discern the quality of a product prior to purchase and can never identify its producer. Producing high-quality, safe goods is costly for a firm and raises the collective reputation for quality...

We consider a health authority seeking to allocate annual budgets optimally over time to minimize the discounted social cost of infection(s) evolving in a finite set of R = 2 groups. This optimization problem is challenging, since as is well known, the standard epidemiological model describing...

Throughout the developing world, many water distribution systems are unreliable. As a result, it becomes necessary for each household to store its own water as a hedge against this uncertainty. Since arrivals of water are not synchronized across households, serious distributional inefficiencies...

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: Extracted common reserves are aften stored privately rather than immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage.

This paper generalizes Hotelling's (1931) theory of nonrenewable resources to situations where resource pools and their users are distributed spacially. Extraction and transport costs are assumed to be linear in the rate of extraction, but utilization of each deposit may require a setup cost.

When all parties to an agreement are subject to the laws of a single jurisdiction, then anyone breaking that agreement can be subjected to legal sanctions. If, however, parties to an agreement are themselves sovereign states, no external force exists to assure compliance. In such cases the...