In cooperative stochastic dynamic games a stringent condition — subgame consistency — is required for a dynamically stable solution. A cooperative solution is subgame consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought...

In cooperative stochastic dynamic games a stringent condition — that of subgame consistency — is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time...

Collected papers presented on the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Graduate School of Management SPbU, 2011. – 514 p.

The collection contains abstracts of papers accepted for the Fifth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 27–29, 2011, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented abstracts belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The...

This volume gathers together 26 selected papers from the International Congress of Mathematicians' 1st Satellite Conference on Game Theory and its Applications (2002). It contains four sections: Foundations, Concepts, and Structure; Equilibrium Properties; Applications to the Natural and Social...

The collection contains papers accepted for the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 24-26, 2009, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be...

The collection contains abstracts of papers accepted for the International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 28–30, 2010, St. Petersburg University, Russia). The presented abstracts belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The abstract volume may be...

This paper presents a solution formula for the payoff distribution procedure of a bargaining problem in cooperative differential game that would lead to a time consistent outcome. In particular, individual rationality is satisfied for every player throughout the cooperation period.

The collection contains papers accepted for the Fifth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 27–29, 2011, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be...