We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...

We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We showthat restricted...

We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f -optimal outcome. We showthat restricted...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...

This paper proposes new necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation. Our result says that especially in certain environments including matching environments, restricted monotonicity alone is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation.Our application of the result to a...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism....