This study investigates market reactions to announcements of CEO turnover and finds that forced turnovers are not accompanied by positive returns, which contradicts the broad view that firing a CEO sends a positive signal to the market. This contradiction is further explored by focusing on the...

This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value-increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication...

Shareholders pay considerable attention to the choice of executive selected as the new CEO whenever a change in leadership takes place. However, without an inside look at the leading candidates to assume the CEO role, it is difficult for shareholders to tell whether the board has made the...

I investigate whether CEO turnovers - forced, as well as voluntary - are accompanied by changes in firm performance, and whether governance provisions associated with managerial entrenchment affect these changes. Using data on CEO turnovers in the 800 largest U.S. companies occurring over the...

This article examines recent literature on corporate boards and the interplay between director gender and CEO turnover and how it affects firm performance after CEO turnover. The primary focus is board gender diversity and CEO job embeddedness in entrepreneurial firms. This article discusses...

To gain insights about the quality of board's firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-collected sample of 208 "clean" turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...