This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...

The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms' strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader's...

Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a “co-opetition” game of data brokers and characterise their optimal strategies. When data are “sub-additive” with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the...

Data brokers collect, manage, and sell customer data. We propose a simple model, in which data brokers sell data to downstream firms. We characterise the optimal strategy of data brokers and highlight the role played by the data structure for co-opetition. If data are “sub-additive”, with...

The unprecedented access of firms to consumer-level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms’ strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price...

Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is beneficial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency...

This paper introduces a two-stage union-oligopoly-council model of wage and employment determination wherein at the first stage wage is negotiated through collective bargaining and at the second stage employment in each firm is co-determined by the employer and its works council. We provide a...

This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...

This paper introduces a two-stage union-oligopoly-council model of wage and employment determination wherein at the first stage wage is negotiated through collective bargaining and at the second stage employment in each firm is co-determined by the employer and its works council. We provide a...