A literature has grown up around papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) which shows how governments have an incentive to inflate the economy (to generate extra output) then the private sector will anticipate this and the economy will stick at a high inflation...

We calculate the welfare cost of nominal inertia in a New Neoclassical Synthesis model with wage and price stickiness, capital formation, and empirically estimated rules for government spending and the cental bank's interest rate policy. We calibrate our model to U.S. data, and we show that it...

First, we modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization tradeoff will remain, even when a performance contract of the type envisaged by Walsh (1995) is imposed on the central bank governor. We do this by modeling a real interest rate bias along with the inflation bias. Then,...

Fifty years ago, the Chicago School argued that flexible exchange rates would insulate employment from foreign economic disturbances: there is no need for policy coordination; flexible exchange rates suffice. Twenty five years later, the Bretton Woods system was gone, and the first generation of...

The fiscal theory of price determination suggests that if primary surpluses evolve independently of government debt, the equilibrium price level "jumps" to assure fiscal solvency. In this non-Ricardian regime, fiscal policy--not monetary policy--provides the nominal anchor. Alternatively, in a...