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Di Cagno, Daniela; Galliera, Arianna; Güth, Werner; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/22, pp. 1-24

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849321

Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games

Doll, Monika; Seebauer, Michael; Tonn, Maren - 2017

We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split … 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as … gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011707289

Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Capizzani, Mario; Mittone, Luigi; Musau, Andrew; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-20

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709209

The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game : does it even exist? : [corrected version of DP 1708]

Demiral, Elif E.; Mollerstrom, Johanna - 2018 - Corrected version of DP 1708

Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011898931

Predictably angry-facial cues provide a credible signal of destructive behavior

Leeuwen, Boris van; Noussair, Charles; Offerman, Theo; … - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 64 (2018) 7, pp. 3352-3364

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899798

How to split gains and losses? : experimental evidence of dictator and ultimatum games

Neumann, Thomas; Kierspel, Sabrina; Windrich, Ivo; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/78, pp. 1-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993245

When fairness matters : cross-race responses to intentionally fair treatment

Harvey, Matthew; Nickerson, David W.; Wozniak, Abigail K. - 2023

Do White and Black Americans differ in their response to fair versus unfair treatment, and do these reactions depend on whether treatment is intentional? We study an ultimatum game in which we non-deceptively vary three dimensions: racial identities of participants, offer inequality, and whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014423753

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2021

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476

Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options : conference paper

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three different equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338950

The effects of enforced reflection in three simple experiments

Frank, Björn - 2010

related to the time taken for these decisions. Other authors have investigated this relationship by exerting some time … pressure. In this paper, I report on an attempt to do the opposite, i.e., to enforce a longer reflection time. To ensure that … significantly higher, which is in conflict with Rubinstein's conjecture that 50:50 offers take less time because they are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286422