Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions and reduces the free rider problem; however, a substantial amount of punishment is targeted on high contributors. In the experiment reported here, subjects are given the...

This paper presents a framework for the evaluation and measurement of reversal and origin independence as separate aspects of economic mobility. We show how that evaluation depends on aversion to multi-period inequality, aversion to inter-temporal fluctuations, and aversion to future risk. We...

This paper uses a tractable macroeconomic model with idiosyncratic human capital risk and incomplete markets to analyze the growth and welfare effects of business cycles. The analysis is based on the assumption that the elimination of business cycles eliminates the variation in idiosyncratic...

It is well known that a social choice function is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if it is incentive compatible. However, in general it is not possible to rule out other equilibrium outcomes, and additional conditions, e.g., Bayesian monotonicity, are needed to...

We compare two devices previously found to increase contributions to public goods in laboratory experiments: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their contribution decisions). We find that communication...

This paper argues that an external monitor can be less effective when there is uncertainty regarding the quality of the management and the business environment. In a two-period model, an outside monitor, who initially does not know managerial quality, can have the manager fired. The manager...

In this note we consider several versions of the bootstrap and argue that it is helpful in explaining and thinking about such procedures to use an explicit representation of the random resampling process. To illustrate the point we give such explicit representations and use them to produce some...

We compare two devices previously found to increase contributions to public goods in laboratory experiments: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their contribution decisions). We find that communication...

It is well-know that estimation by reduced rank regression is given by the solution to a generalized eigenvalue problem. This paper presents a new proof to establish this result and provides additional insight into the structure of the estimation problem. The proof is a direct algebraic proof...