Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the...

We report results from a weak-link – often also called minimum-effort – game experiment with multiple Pareto-ranked strict pure-strategy Nash equilibria, using a real-effort rather than a chosen-effort task: subjects have to sort and count coins and their payoff depends on the worst...

Traditionally, enforcement of consumer protection laws meant to provide quality assurance of goods and services was considered a responsibility of the state in its various guises. Unfortunately, enforcement is an expensive, and hence particularly problematic proposition in transition economies...

Are communication failures common? We revisit a classic example of experimental coordination failure and explore, in a 2x2 design, the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance. Our results suggest how to engineer coordination successes in the laboratory, and possibly in the wild.

Murray Rothbard's posthumous Economic Thought Before Adam Smith is notable for its vilification of 'the quiet Scottish professor.' While there is little disagreement that Smith was, at best, an ambivalent champion of free markets, Rothbard's indictment of him as a proto-Marxist is less than...

With about two initial public offerings per year, the number of publicly traded degree-granting providers of post-secondary education in the United States has grown steadily ever since the Apollo Group (University of Phoenix, College of Financial Planning, etc.) went public in December 1994. To...

Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122–142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. They find significant amounts of trust and reciprocity and conclude that trust is a guiding behavioral instinct (a “primitive†in their terminology). We modify...

In this note, the authors describe a simple, flexible, and instructive moral hazard experiment. It can be used in a variety of classes, including principles classes, to illustrate the basic incentive conflicts in principal-agent interactions, the importance of information, and the power of...

The author presents a brief classroom demonstration illustrating Bertrand price undercutting. The demonstration is appropriate for micro principles and intermediate- and upper-level undergraduate classes, as well as graduate classes in micro, industrial organization, and game theory.