Traditional principal agent theory interprets franchising as a solution to the agency problems associated with incentives and observability. Franchising has been viewed as an institution that aligns the right to make decisions with the residual claims deriving from these decisions. One problem...

Dieser Artikel basiert auf Ergebnissen des Projektes "Strukturwandel der Industrie und Neubestimmung des Positiondes Industriemeisters", ein Teilprojekt innerhalb des Forschungsverbundes "Untersuchung zur Rolle des mittleren/unterenManagements (Industriemeister, Fachexperten)", gefördert durch...

Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird modelltheoretisch gezeigt, dass die - auch in der Realitätbeobachtbare - Schaffung von Überkapazitäten eine rationale Unternehmensstrategiezur Begrenzung politischer Risiken sein kann. Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, wiesolche Überinvestitionen aus...

This discussion paper provides an overview of conceptual arguments and empirical findings with respect to services within multinational corporations. The focus of the analysis is on the organization and managment of efficient internal services, particularly in global firms. Unfortunately, these...

In this paper, we examine ownership structures of franchise chains and evaluate their impact on franchisor profit. Specifically we compare pure forms of franchising with those that use both company-owned and franchised outlets within one chain - a phenomenon termed the plural form. Theoretically...

Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat...