land tenancy contract they signed with their tenant and similar subjective perception as a result of the (hypothetical …) alternative contract. This paper discusses how one might explicitly incorporate subjective perceptions in applied contract theory …

-rent contracts in U.S. agriculture. The focus is on the contribution of explanatory variables that represent transaction costs, risk …-sharing incentives, or both. An empirical model of contract choice is tested against the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership … Survey (AELOS) and finds mixed evidence for low transaction cost and risk-sharing-incentive motives for landlord …

risk-sharing and moral hazard is far from settled. Moreover, existing empirical study very often plague by selection … decision and contract choice are simultaneous. A modified Heckman model is estimated which avoids the selectivity bias of … observed contracts. Empirical tests reject the hypothesis of pure risk sharing and a wide range of support for the presence of …

strength of the landlord’s property right increasing in the amount of risk she chooses to bear within the contract …. Sharecropping may thus emerge as the optimal contract even when the tenant is risk-neutral. Using data on landlords’ subjective … property rights drive contract choice while offering little support in favor of the canonical hypothesis that risk sharing …