Analyzing economic behavior using virtual world cybergames.

A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...

I present and study an evolutionary model of immigration and culturaltransmission of social norms in a set-up where agents are repeatedly matchedto play a one-shot interaction prisoner´s dilemma. Matching can be non-randomdue to limited integration (or population viscosity). The latter refers...

The application of computer simulation as a research method raises two important questions: (1) Does simulation really offer added value over established methods? (2) How can the danger of arbitrariness caused by the extended modelling possibilities be minimised? We present the concept of...

The aim of this note is to clarify and to correct some arguments which are used in the debate about the comparison of discrete social simulation with other methodologies used in the study of social phenomena, notably those of game theory. Though part of what will be said also applies to...

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For finite games in strategic form it is shown that, in a Nash equlibrium, every player uses a strategy which is computable. However, there can exist no algorithm which is guaranteed to find an equilibrium for every instance of a game with computable payoffs. In contrast, an e-equilibrium is...

This paper considers four examples of apparent progress in economics, each of which proved illusory. In each case the problem stemmed from factual errors. The cases relate to the treatment by Arrow of the incentives to finance basic research, the obliteration of industrial economics by game...