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Trust and Reciprocity Among International Groups : Experimental Evidence from Austria and Japan
Akai, Kenju; Netzer, Robert J. - 2010
modified trust game played among groups from Austria and Japan, in which subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee …. Intranational reciprocity in Austria is greater than in Japan, but there is no significant difference in international reciprocity … international reciprocity in both countries, although this effect is weaker in Japan than in Austria. Expected returns enhance trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207846
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Trust and reciprocity among international groups : experimental evidence from Austria and Japan
Akai, Kenju; Netzer, Robert Jiro - In: The journal of socio-economics 41 (2012) 2, pp. 266-276
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615084
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Co-managing common pool resources : do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms
Vollan, Björn; Prediger, Sebastian; Frölich, Markus - 2013
We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009764816
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Intercultural trust : an experiment in Austria and Japan
Netzer, Robert Jiro; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
the country-specific differences. -- intercultural experiment ; intracultural experiment ; trust game ; Austria ; Japan …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733213
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Co-managing common pool resources: Do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms
Vollan, Björn; Prediger, Sebastian; Frölich, Markus - 2013
We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397156
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On the social appropriateness of discrimination
Barr, Abigail; Lane, Tom; Nosenzo, Daniele - 2015
Understanding what motivates discrimination is of importance to economists and social scientists in general. In this paper, the authors address whether the taste to discriminate against outsiders is related to social norms. Recent studies have shown various different types of economic behaviour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434327
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The Effect of Social Information in the Dictator Game with a Taking Option
O'Garra, Tanya - 2019
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types', and thus distinguish ‘conformists' from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865728
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309
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An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option
Yao, Koffi Serge William - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-14
This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650460
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Timing of Commitment in Coalitional Bargaining
Siegenthaler, Simon; Kamm, Aaron - 2021
The power to influence the allocation of resources in coalitional bargaining stems from an agent's ability to form multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality). We distinguish between coalitional commitment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241611