We interpret the TV-show Come Dine with Me as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with evaluation levels as strategic variables, and show that it belongs to a class of strategic games which we label mutual evaluations games (MEG). Any MEG possesses a "zero equilibrium" - i. e. a Nash equilibrium...

Teams, in both firms and in sports, jointly produce a product. While a fixed task is assigned to each member of a team, the individual team productivity of a worker or player is difficult to conceptualize. This is particularly true, if this concept is aimed to be operable on observable data. In...

We explore effects of simultaneous price changes for the demand of a group of goods, which we refer to as a compound commodity. Specifically, we consider unit and proportional cost components (e. g., taxes, transportation costs, etc.) imposed on the compound commodity. We find that there is a...

We consider a government facing a constraint on the total consumption of a specific good with varieties, and formulate an optimal commodity tax problem under a consumption target. We obtain a uniform pricing result (similar to the familiar uniform taxation rule): setting the same consumer price...

Authors who consider efficient bargaining on the labor market predominantly focus on the Nash-bargaining solution. It seems, however, that actual labor market negotiations between an employers federation and a labor union are often characterized by mutual concessions, which may be accounted for...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...