Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information … about a firm's type to its competitors. Thereby, asymmetric information between banks is reduced and bank competition …

Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information … about a firm's type to its competitors. Thereby, asymmetric information between banks is reduced and bank competition …

Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information … about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby, asymmetric information between banks is reduced and bank competition …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a …