The increasing availability of data in credit markets may appear to make adverse selection concerns less relevant. However, when there is adverse selection, more information does not necessarily increase welfare. We provide tools for making better use of the data that is collected from potential...

We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with "low-doc'' mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession...

This paper examines the conditions for credit volume or borrower rationing in a competitive credit market in which the project characteristics are private information of the borrowers. There can only be credit volume rationing if the higher-risk credit applicants have a higher return in the...

Provision of credit guarantees or subsidies may remove an adverse selection leading to credit rationing. This paper concentrates on comparison of government budget costs of credit guarantees and subsidies in a monopolistic credit market. Different opportunity costs among entrepreneurs, which...