This paper proposes two (ordinal and cardinal) generalizations of [J.C. Harsanyi, R. Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1988] risk-dominance to multi-player, multi-action games. There are three reasons why generalized risk-dominance...

This note provides simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparison of information structures in zero-sum games. This solves an open problem of Grossner and Mertens [Gossner, O., Mertens, J.-F., 2001. The value of information in zero-sum games....

We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks,...

We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually...

In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential...

This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and equal discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I depend on one of two possible states of the world, which is known to her. The payoffs of the uninformed player U do not depend on the state...

This paper is concerned with the problem of combining a data set that identifies the conditional distribution P (y|x) with one that identifies the conditional distribution P (z|x), in order to identify the regressions E (y|x, middot) identical with [E (y|x, z = j), j element of Z] when the...