<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating postproduction firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity,...

Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating post-production firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity, which...

We investigate a potential selection benefit of stock-based compensation for rank-and-file employees, whose pay under this compensation form is insensitive to their individual efforts. Using a laboratory experiment, where we control for both the timing and expected magnitude of compensation, we...

This study examines whether eliciting self-evaluations increases or decreases the propensity of a productive agent to retaliate against an employer for paying compensation that the agent perceives to be too low for the work performed. Specifically, I consider a setting in which a principal knows...

We investigate how the budget levels embedded in budget-based contracts affect individual effort and risk-taking. We show that, from a wealth maximization perspective, a tradeoff exists between motivating effort and encouraging risk-taking. We illustrate an inverted-U relation between budget...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>We examine how worker productivity differs when compensation is based on quantity, creativity, or the product of both measures. In an experiment in which participants design "rebus puzzles," we find that combining quantity and creativity measures in a creativity-weighted pay scheme...