Keynes (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) have articulated an aversion toward betting on an urn containing balls of two colors of unknown proportion to one with a 50-50 composition. Keynes views this as reflecting different preferences for bets arising from different sources of uncertainty. Ellsberg...

We address a basic diffculty with incorporating fairness into standard utilitarian choice theories. Standard utilitarian theories evaluate lotteries according to the (weighted) utility over ?nal outcomes and assume in particular that a lottery is never preferred over getting the most preferred...

This paper presents an experimental study analyzing common consequence effects with binary choice, willingness-to-pay (WTP), and willingness-to-accept (WTA). Consistent with previous research we do not find clearcut evidence of fanning out in the absence of certainty effects. Violation rates of...

We investigate whether violations of canonical axioms of choice under risk are mistakes or a manifestation of true preferences. First, we elicit axiom and gamble preferences and then allow subjects to revise their potentially conflicting preferences. Among the behavioral patterns that allow for...

We investigate whether violations of canonical axioms of choice under risk are mistakes or a manifestation of true preferences. First, we elicit axiom and gamble preferences and then allow subjects to revise their potentially conflicting preferences. Among the behavioral patterns that allow for...

A continuing goal of experiments is to understand risky decisions when the decisions are important. Often a decision's importance relates to the magnitude of the associated monetary stake. Khaneman and Tversky (1979) argue that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using...