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Local agency costs of political centralization

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 425-448

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587346

Experimentation in federal systems

Callander, Steven; Harstad, Bård - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208635

Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs

Dreher, Axel; Langlotz, Sarah; Marchesi, Silvia - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011642641

Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs

Dreher, Axel; Langlotz, Sarah; Marchesi, Silvia - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 55 (2017) 4, pp. 1671-1688

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011814608

Handbook of fiscal federalism

Ahmad, Ehtisham (ed.); Brosio, Giorgio (ed.) - 2006

pt. 1. Approaches to fiscal federalism -- pt. 2. Decentralization and development -- pt. 3. Implementing multilevel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011851106

Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures : theory and evidence

Dreher, Axel; Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannēs, Chrēstos; … - In: Oxford economic papers 70 (2018) 1, pp. 243-265

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822759

Experimentation in Federal Systems

Callander, Steven - 2013

We present a model where heterogeneous districts choose both whether to experiment and the policies to experiment with. Since districts learn from each other, the first-best requires that policy experiments converge so that innovations are useful also for neighbors. However, the equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459061

Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

Dreher, Axel - 2017

We investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid should grant to recipient governments when their preferences over how to implement the aid are different, and both the donor and recipient possess some private information about the most effective policies. Intuitively, our model shows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965388

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures : Theory and Evidence

Dreher, Axel; Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannis, Christos; … - 2016

-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative policy-decision schemes — ‘decentralization’ and ‘centralization’ — when ‘knowledge … explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal … government levels. It is shown that, depending on which level of policy decision making controls the degree of decentralization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153753

Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

Dreher, Axel; Marchesi, Silvia - 2014

example of a "delegation-scheme." Conversely, project aid represents a more "centralized" type of aid. According to the theory …' information is more relevant (centralization). The empirical analysis confirms that the importance of donors' private information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149197