This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japaneseflower markets, there is an additional stage, called 'mari', where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers at...

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modified version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japanese flower markets, there is an additional stage, called “mari,” where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modified version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japanese flower markets, there is an additional stage, called "mari", where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers at...

An all-pay auction in which the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and the handicap, the latter of which is endowed to the players, is analyzed. The bidding strategy in an equilibrium is explicitly derived as a "piecewise affine transformation" of the equilibrium strategy in...

In dynamic principal-agent relationships, it is sometimes observed that the agent's reward depends only on the final outcome. For example, a student's grade in a course quite often depends only on the final exam score, where the performance in the problem sets and the mid-term exam is ignored....

In dynamic principal-agent relationships, it is sometimes observed that the agent's reward depends only on the final outcome. For example, a student's grade in a course quite often depends only on the final exam score, where the performance in the problem sets and the mid-term exam is ignored....