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Standards and incentives under moral hazard with limited liability

Reinshagen, Felix - 2012

We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490184

Public policy for venture capital

Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo - 2001

capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398877

Value creation and value capture under moral hazard : exploring the micro-foundations of buyer- supplier relationships

Obloj, Tomasz; Zemsky, Peter - In: Strategic management journal 36 (2015) 8, pp. 1146-1163

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398906

Merger performance and managerial incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291

Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device

Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011287665

Optimal marginal deterrence and incentives for precaution

Thomas, Lionel - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 11 (2015) 3, pp. 409-433

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381777

Moral hazard contracting and credit rationing in opaque credit markets

He, Xin - In: International journal of computational economics and … 5 (2015) 1, pp. 12-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317312

Background risk in the principal-agent model

Ligon, James Allen; Thistle, Paul D. - In: The Geneva risk and insurance review 38 (2013) 2, pp. 115-126

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227384

Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship

Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008

Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By … combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive … relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018

Understanding severance pay

Parsons, Donald O. - 2013

Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195446