This paper shows how competition between interests can internalize economic externalities groups. The key feature is that some lobby groups give political voice to environmental demands. We illustrate the basic ideas in a common agency model of politics, into which we introduce a negative output...

Geological carbon sequestration seems one of the promising options to address, in the near term, the global problem of climate change, since carbon sequestration technologies are in principle available today and their costs are expected to be affordable. Whereas extensive technological and...

The paper analyzes the implications of local and global pollution when two types of abatement activities can be undertaken. One type reduces solely local pollution (e.g., use of particulate matter filters) while the other mitigates global pollution as well (e.g., application of fuel saving...

Recent studies find that environmental tax swaps typically exacerbate the costs of the tax system and therefore do not produce a "double dividend". We extend previous models by incorporating tax-favored consumption goods (e.g. housing, medical care). The efficiency gains from recycling...

The neoclassical model argues that environmental regulations impede industrial performance. In this paper, we shed light on two features of environmental regulations in developing countries that have received little attention and that give rise to unexpected outcomes with respect to industry...

This paper shows how competition between interests can internalize economic externalities groups. The key feature is that some lobby groups give political voice to environmental demands. We illustrate the basic ideas in a common agency model of politics, into which we introduce a negative output...

This paper investigates the extent to which interjurisdictional spillovers -- transboundary pollution and the so-called 'race to the bottom' -- distort decentralized environmental regulation in practice. To that end, I develop a model in which local jurisdictions set regulations by trading-off...

In this paper we investigate environmental regulation by taxes and quotas in the context of a monopolistically competitive industry. Firstly, we find the combination of a quota and a tax supporting the first best solution. Secondly, we explain why the allocative equivalence between the two...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...