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This paper studies the impact of labour taxation in a shirking model with wage bargaining.It is shown that if the ratio of unemployment compensation to the net-of-tax wage iskept fixed a tax cut leads to higher unemployment. When the unemployment benefitsreplacement ratio is allowed to change,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868370
We examine the impact of economic deregulation on employer evasion of union-mandated "formal" wage-contracts in an import-competing industry. We show that, if the state maintains industrial employment despite import liberalisation, through cheaper credit to firms, then employer evasion will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011535035
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We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership andcontrol. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model isproposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of thefirm's hiring and investment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005843489
Als zentralem Bestandteil der internationalen Finanzarchitektur kommt dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) heutzutage immer öfter die Aufgabe zu, bei Verschuldungskrisen souveräner Staaten, insbesondere weit fortgeschrittener Schwellen- und Transformationsländer, als multilateraler...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471827
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivatedto work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2)manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent’saction is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844584
We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866609