Opportunities to precommit costs can either i ncrease the rents of incumbent firms (by deterring entry), or decrease them (thr ough commitment races and lapses into noncooperation). Authors seek to discrimin ate statistically between these predictions in the determinants of profits of bu...

This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by interactions between Linux, an...

This introductory essay connects the various contributions included in the special issue on strategic dynamics and contrasts them with the static analyses that predominate in the strategy field. In addition to highlighting a variety of methodological approaches, the contributions shed...

This paper contains theoretical and empirical analysis of competition to retain customers. A formal game-theoretic model suggests that large firms are likely to exhibit greater customer retention rates than their smaller rivals in equilibrium even when their (common) customer retention...

This paper uses a case study and a simple mathematical model to study the link between the incumbency and incentives to innovate and introduce drastically new products. It identifies the conditions under which fears of self-cannibalization are particularly likely to lead incumbents to soft-pedal...

In a declining industry, shrinking demand creates pressure for capacity to be reduced. Who exits first? There is a unique perfect equilibrium for firms with asymmetric market shares and identical unit costs in which survivability is inversely related to size: the largest firm can profitably...

There is a widespread belief that increases in the cross-border integration of markets are associated with increases in global concentration along various dimensions. This article reviews the available evidence and presents new data, indicating that increasing global integration has not been...