We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r 1 “production factors” that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as...

This volume is a monograph on the geometric structure of a certain class of ("comprehensive") compact polyhedra called Cephoids. A Cephoid is a Minkowski sum of finitely many standardized simplices. The emphasis rests on the Pareto surface of Cephoids which consists of certain translates of...

We discuss large but finite linear market games which are represented as minima of finitely many measures. These games describe markets in which the agents decompose into finitely many disjoint groups each of which holds a corner of the market. Most solution concepts like the core, the Shapley...

A Cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU-game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles.

A Cephoid is a Minkowski sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. We discuss the concept of duality for Cephoids. Also, we show that the reference number uniquely defines a face. Based on these results, we exhibit two graphs on the outer surface of a cephoid. The first one corresponds to a maximal...

Within this paper we compute the Minkowski sum of prisms ("Cephoids") in a finite-dimensional vector space. We provide a representation of a finite sum of prisms in terms of inequalities.