Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard...

Ökonomen und Politiker beklagen sich gelegentlich übereinander. Die Ökonomen meinen, das politische Alltagsgeschäft berücksichtige die Erkenntnisse der Wissenschaft zu wenig und sei mit inkonsistenten Maßnahmen und suboptimalen Ergebnissen verbunden. Die Politiker sehen sich dagegen zum...

Experimental studies of the WTP-WTA gap avoid social trading by implementing an incentive compatible mechanism for each individual trader. We compare a traditional random price mechanism and a novel elicitation mechanism preserving social trading, without sacrificing mutual incentive...

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...

We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms' workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation...

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paper explores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural norm(ative) facts" within the search for an inter-personal (W)RE - (Wide) Reflective Equilibrium on normative issues. Assuming that pro-social behaviour...

Die Verhaltensökonomie und ihre praktischen Implikationen geraten immer stärker in den Fokus auch der deutschen Politik. Individuelle Entscheidungen sollen im Sinne eines "libertären Paternalismus" sanft beeinflusst werden. Die 'Nudges' bestehen in Standardvorgaben, Selbstbindungen und der...

In capacity-then-price-setting games, soft capacity constraints are planned sales amounts where producing above capacity is possible but more costly. While the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts equal prices, experimental evidence often reveals price discrepancies. This failure to coordinate...