We assume that central banks can control inflation so that inflation rates reflect the preferences of the central bank council. The hypothesis to be tested is that these preferences depend on the central bankers' educational and/or professional background. In a panel data analysis for the euro...

This paper analyses the role of inflation expectations in the euro area. On one hand, the question is how inflation expectations affect both inflation and output, and, on the other hand, how inflation expectations reflect developments in these variables. The analyses make use of a simple VAR...

Japan's government debt is extremely high, especially considering the fact that the data exclude likely future liabilities stemming from an ageing population and possible requirements of the financial system. Nevertheless, an offsetting factor is the degree to which the Bank of Japan has already...

In this paper we review and extend some of the key lessons that seem to be emerging from the Ramsey-inspired theory of dynamic optimal monetary and fiscal policies. We construct measures of the key distortions in our economy; we label these 'dynamic wedges'. Inflation, actual or anticipated,...

We study the consequences of non-neutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in an environment where prices are sticky. Assuming transaction services of government bonds, Ricardian equivalence fails because public debt has a negative impact on its marginal rate of return...

This paper addresses the following question: If a financial crisis affecting a group of emerging economies were to take place sometime over the next three years, where would the crisis likely originate, how could it be transmitted to other economies, and which economies would be most affected by...

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

The theoretical argument for central bank independence is based on the idea that even if the government represents people's preferences over inflation and output it has an incentive to renege from prearranged plans to gain a short run boost to output. This incentive leads to higher than desired...

This paper aims to juxtapose the theoretical and empirical literature on policy rules and targeting procedures alongside the United Kingdom's new monetary framework. For example, how does inflation targeting, as practised in the United Kingdom, compare with the optimal feedback rule for monetary...

The leading indicator properties of various of the money and credit aggregates over real activity and inflation is assessed, using Granger-causality tests and impulse response functions. The approach is explicitly disaggregated, looking at sectoral measures of money and credit and various...