Consider a group of people confronted with a dichotomous choice (for example, a yes or no decision). Assume that we can characterize each person by a probability, p <Subscript>i</Subscript>, of making the ‘better’ of the two choices open to the group, such that we define ‘better’ in terms of some linear...</subscript>

In re-analyzing the Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) examination of ‘rational’ abstention we found that admitting mixed strategies does not affect findings as to the optimal behavior of voters who are expected utility maximizers but does significantly affect our expectations as to behavior of...

Niemi (1969), in an important but neglected paper, found that when orderings were drawn from a simulation based on the impartial culture, the greater the proportion of voter orderings that were single-peaked (a condition he called partial single-peakedness), the more likely was there to be a...

The Banks set (1(4):295–306, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>) is one of the more important concepts in voting theory since it tells us about the sophisticated outcomes of standard amendment voting procedures commonly in use throughout the English speaking world (and elsewhere as well). While the properties of the Banks...</citationref>