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Employee discharge and reinstatement : moral hazards and the mixed consequences of last change agreements
Bamberger, Peter A.; Donahue, Linda H. - In: ILR review : the journal of work and policy 53 (1999/2000) 1, pp. 3-20
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001414523
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Fixed-term contracts and the dynamics of labour demand
Goux, Dominique; Maurin, Eric; Pauchet, Marianne - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001355608
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Contract-theoretic approaches to wages and displacement
Den Haan, Wouter J.; Ramey, Garey; Watson, Joel - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001368213
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Personalfreisetzungsstrategien und Personalfreisetzungsalternativen : eine transaktionskostentheoretische Untersuchung
Park, Yang-Kyu - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001374405
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Contract-theoretic approaches to wages and displacement
Den Haan, Wouter J.; Ramey, Garey; Watson, Joel - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001381049
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Labor-market flexibility and aggregate employment volatility : a comment
Blanchard, Olivier - In: Carnegie Rochester conference series on public policy : … 46 (1997), pp. 229-239
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230405
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Labor-market flexibility and aggregate employment volatility
Cabrales, Antonio - In: Carnegie Rochester conference series on public policy : … 46 (1997), pp. 189-228
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230406
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Contracts, hold-up, and labor markets
Malcomson, James M. - In: Journal of economic literature 35 (1997) 4, pp. 1916-1957
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001231171
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Dismissals and match-specific rents
Black, Dan A. - In: Labour economics : official journal of the European … 4 (1997) 4, pp. 325-340
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001231584
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Fair pay and a wagebill argument for wage rigidity and excessive employment variability
Thomas, Jonathan P. - 2000
This paper considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. Under an assumption on the information available to workers, it is shown that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001452346