Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan from a set of complex non-linear contracts is a complicated decision often made without full information...

We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels––“vertical choice”––in regulated health insurance markets. Though the efficient level of coverage, which trades off the value of risk protection and the social cost from moral hazard, likely varies across consumers,...

Background As health care cost is taking an increasingly substantial proportion of national wealth, health shocks and the subsequent medical expenditures have become increasingly vital contributions to fnancial risks. However, the individual or combined efects of social and fnancial medical...

Market provision of impure public goods such as insurance retirement savings and education is common and growing as policy makers seek to offer more choice and gain efficiencies. This approach induces an important trade-off between improved surplus from matching individuals to products and...

We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that...

We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels—“vertical choice”—in regulated health insurance markets. We emphasize that heterogeneity in the efficient level of coverage is not sufficient to motivate choice. When premiums do not reflect individuals' costs, it may...