Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different...

The purpose of this paper is to use fairly standard game theory elements and apply them to free trade agreements (FTA) made within ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries and outside countries and the rest of the world (ROW). The applications use some mathematics, but it is not my intent to...

We study prisoner's dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in...

Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable)...

This paper considers the estimation problem of structural models for which empirical restrictions are characterized by a fixed point constraint, such as structural dynamic discrete choice models or models of dynamic games. We analyze the conditions under which the nested pseudo-likelihood (NPL)...

The famous game of two cars is a pursuit-evasion dynamic game. In theextended version presented here, a correct driver (evader) on a freeway detectsa wrong-way driver (pursuer in a worst case scenario), i.e., a car driving on thewrong lanes of the road or in the wrong direction. The correct...

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of anasset market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfo-lio rules), distributing their wealth between...

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

This paper provides an in-depth study of the (most) refined best reply correspondence introduced by Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2012). An example demonstrates that this correspondence can be very different from the standard best reply correspondence. In two-player games, however, the...

We construct a model in which a number of equally powerful ethnic groups compete for power by engaging in civil war. In non-redistributive equilibrium, ethnically homogeneous and ethnically diverse countries face a lower probability of civil war than countries with a moderate degree of ethnic...