Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der zahlungsorientierten Gestaltung von Werkverträgen. Zunächst werden die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen dargestellt. Dann werden Alternativen zur Definition des Preises diskutiert und verschiedene Zahlungsmodalitäten untersucht. Mehrere Fallstudien aus...

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment...

We study the informational channel of financial contagion under laboratory conditions. In our experiment, two markets with correlated fundamentals open sequentially and in both of them subjects receive private information. Subjects in the market opening second also observe the history of trades...

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We find that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer...