Showing 191 - 200 of 330
Uncertainty in election outcomes generates politically induced regulatory risk. For monopoly regulation, political parties' risk attitudes towards such risk depend on a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at least one party. Irrespective of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705495
In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation principle holds if allocations are modelled as the Cartesian product of outcomes and verifiable information, giving rise to evidence-contingent mechanisms. Consequently, incentive constraints characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705498
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011710129
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011803629
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712283
We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275182
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277257
Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A consumer standard alleviates the regulator’s myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277258
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277272
I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005306193