We consider a linear city model where both firms and consumers have to incur transport costs. Following a standard Hotelling (1929) type framework we analyze a duopoly where firms facing a continuum of consumers choose locations and prices, with the transportation rate being linear in distance....

This article depicts a location game in a circular market. The equivalence results between a convex and a concave transport cost are reexamined by assuming an arbitrary length. In contrast to previous research the solution found shows that the equivalence relationship depends on the space...

The paper models duopolistic competition in so called monotowns: towns with one big factory where most of the citizens are employed. Workers after job go to one of the competitor shops, buy the product and bring it home. Nash equilibrium is found for linear and two-dimensional cases. The...

In this paper the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs is extended to the multi-firm case. The sequential game consists of a location choice stage and a price setting stage. Considering locational equilibria it is shown that neither holds the Principle of Maximum...

The paper models duopolistic competition in so called monotowns: towns with one big factory where most of the citizens are employed. Workers after job go to one of the competitor shops, buy the product and bring it home. Nash equilibrium is found for linear and two-dimensional cases. The...

This article depicts a location game in a circular market. The equivalence results between a convex and a concave transport cost are reexamined by assuming an arbitrary length. In contrast to previous research the solution found shows that the equivalence relationship depends on the space...

The present paper investigates the effects of bargaining structures and agendas on the quality differentiation/location in the final-goods market. The framework is a unionized duopoly industry in the context of an unconstrained Hotelling linear city model. The presence of labor union(s) and the...

In this paper the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs is extended to the multi-firm case. The sequential game consists of a location choice stage and a price setting stage. Considering locational equilibria it is shown that neither holds the Principle of Maximum...

We show that the price-setting subgame in the classic Hotelling’s model (1929) with the linear transport costs has the unique equilibrium solution for all location pairs under the assumption that duopolists secure themselves against being driven out of the market by undercutting. In contrast...

This paper considers price and location decisions of competing duopolists through an approach that integrates the traditional inside location and outside location model. One firm locates inside a linear city along with consumers while the other locates outside it. We analyze a location-price...