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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003704442
This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002868650
This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332257
We propose a model of the widely held firm where management may behave on behalf of shareholders even without external controls. The model shows that there exists a corporate governance mechanism inside the firm where workers are employed on a long-term basis. When effort of young workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012740057
We propose a model of the widely held firm where management may behave on behalf of shareholders even without external controls. The model shows that there exists a corporate governance mechanism inside the firm where workers are employed on a long-term basis. When effort of young workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012741380
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005363434
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007792832
We experimentally explore how investor decision horizons influence the formation of stock prices. We find that in long-horizon sessions, where investors collect dividends till maturity, prices converge to the fundamental levels derived from dividends through backward induction. In short-horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964213
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009312127