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A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Tejada, Oriol - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008504546

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques … - 2012

value, the equal division rule, the equal surplus division rule and the Banzhaf value. The classical axioms of efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587846

Axioms of invariance for TU-games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

value, the equal division rule, the equal surplus division rule and the Banzhaf value. The classical axioms of efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109081

Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control

Ciftci, B.B.; Dimitrov, D.A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control.We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091681

Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality

Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the International Journal of Game Theory, 39, 445-466. See also ''An Axiomatization of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure'', in: Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice (ed. H. de Swart), pp....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257453

Efficient formulas and computational efficiency for glove games

Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2013

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield different distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211890

Efficient Formulas and Computational Efficiency for Glove Games

Belau, Julia - 2013

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327837

An index of unfairness

Aguiar, Victor H.; Pongou, Roland; Serrano, Roberto; … - 2018

Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058639

The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity

Casajus, André - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010311060

The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity

Casajus, André - 2012 - This version: November 30, 2012

We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the efficiency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In … this characterization, efficiency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615 … player axiom. -- Shapley value ; gain-loss axiom ; differential marginality ; efficiency ; additivity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009680709