The paper shows that a transition from a planned to a market economy implies an important change of the structure of production, i. e. a reallocation of resources which takes time and induces sufferings for some people. These sufferings may be reduced by subsidization of some sectors, with some...

We report a new method for Experimenting over a Long Distance (ELD)allowing to simultaneously run decentralized interactive experiments in geographically separated subject pools. Applying ELD to an intercultural trust experiment with participants from Argentina, China and Germany we found a...

This article considers a wide class of censoring problems and presents a construction rule for an objective function. This objective function generalises the ordinary likelihood as well as particular "likelihoods" used for estimation in several censoring models. Under regularity conditions the...

This paper attempts to find out the explanatory power of observed changes in the distribution of current income in explaining the relative change in aggregate consumption using the distributional approach of aggregation by Hildenbrand and Kneip (1999, 2001). The coefficients in the aggregate...

This paper reports laboratory experiments and simulations on a minority game. The minority game is the most important example for a classic non-zerosum- game. The game can be applied on different situations with social and economic contests. We chose an elementary traffic scenario, in which...

The paper attempts to examine whether there is price convergence across various regions in India. Our results indicate significant presence of cross-sectional de- pendence in prices in India, rendering some of the standard panel unit root tests inapplicable. Using various panel unit root tests...

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool...

We report an experiment on a decision task by SAMUELSON and BAZERMAN (1985). Subjects submit a bid for an item with an unknown value. A winner’s curse phenomenon arises when subjects bid too high and make losses. Learning direction theory can account for this. However, other influences on...

In the present paper, we develop a two-sector general equilibrium model of a small open economy to explore the transmission mechanisms of external financial shocks. In particular, we use a cash-in- advance model with limited participation augmented with a financial friction in the form of a...

In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...