We extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither...

The results of an experiment are reported where subjects played within a repeated random matching environment a simple game in extensive form. In this game backward induction based on the focal-point outcome in subgame yields an outcome different from the one that would be deduced using forward...

We call a set of strategies "uniformly evolutionary stable" if the following holds after a small mutation of a monomorphic population playing a strategy in the set: a) No mutant strategy can spread. b) Mutant strategies not in the set will be driven out. c) The meaning of a "small mutation" can...

In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the 2-person bargaining problem. In this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different...

We use the approach of the reduced Game Property and its converse to characterize the sets of stable and semistable demand vectors. It is shown that although these two concepts are generally very different their axiomatizations are almost the same. Regarding the semistable demand vector we...