If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price … auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

This paper studies `knockout' auctions, typically organized by bidding rings, in which the winning bidder makes side … unbiased estimates of the item's price in the absence of collusion. This paper evaluates the extent of this overestimate in the …