demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more aggressive bidding. On the other hand, since collusion decreases …We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of collusion and symmetric mergers among bidders …®ects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions with constant informational content but a varying number of bidders among whom this …

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated …

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price … auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely reaped multiunit uniform price auctions … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price … auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price …

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric …-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the … set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price-quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …