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Internal and external political competition
Hugh-Jones, David - 2009
changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours. -- political competition ; dictatorship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003887115
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Why do military dictatorships become presidential democracies? : mapping the democratic interests of autocratic regimes
Bjørnskov, Christian - 2017
democratization and therefore prefer political institutions with strong veto players. Parallel civilian interests conversely suffer … democratizations are partially planned while most democratization events from civilian autocracy are either unforeseen or poorly … planned. Exploring the characteristics of 111 democratization episodes between 1950 and 2015, I find a number of features …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011763058
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INEQUALITY AND SEQUENCE OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Mizuno, Nobuhiro - In: Journal of Economic Development 35 (2010) 1, pp. 1-13
Some recent empirical studies found positive effects of economic liberalization on democratization. Based on these … findings, this paper explains why the sequence of economic liberalization and democratization is related to the effects of the … two reforms on economic performance. Since economic liberalization increases the probability of democratization and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009350230
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Enfranchisement, Political Participation and Political Competition: Evidence from Colonial India
Cassan, Guilhem; Iyer, Lakshmi; Mirza, Rinchan Ali - 2020
We examine how political participation and political competition are shaped by two class-based extensions of the franchise in 20th-century India. Creating a new dataset of district level political outcomes between 1921 and 1957, we find that the partial franchise extension of 1935 resulted in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012270154
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Enfranchisement, political participation and political competition: evidence from colonial India
Cassan, Guilhem; Lakshmi Iyer; Ali Mirza, Rinchan - 2020
We examine how political participation and political competition are shaped by two class-based extensions of the franchise in 20th-century India. Creating a new dataset of district level political outcomes between 1921 and 1957, we find that the partial franchise extension of 1935 resulted in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012249605
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Coup Process and Private Information Under Autocracy
Li, Fangfang - 2009
Traditional point views the success of coup as the shifting of focal point from supporting dictator to supporting coup plotter, which cannot be rationalized. When we look at coup's micro-process, we find that it is rationalizable. In this paper, I propose a model of coup with unique sub-game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157047
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Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy
Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito's government launching a war against the United States, or Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250204
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Dynamic Enfranchisement
Lagunoff, Roger; Jack, William - 2003
Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We study properties of dynamic enfranchisement games, dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030461
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The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession
Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - EconWPA - 2005
The winner of a battle for a throne can either execute or spare the loser; if the loser is spared, he contends the throne in the next period. Executing the losing contender gives the winner an additional quiet period, but then his life is at risk if he loses to some future contender. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550917
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The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession
Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
The winner of a battle for a throne can either execute or spare the loser; if the loser is spared, he contends the throne in the next period. Executing the losing contender gives the winner an additional quiet period, but then his life is at risk if he loses to some future contender who might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114139