Showing 51 - 60 of 48,093
We study the incentives of Cournot oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common cost (or demand) parameter. Since information acquisition is such that firms may fail to acquire information, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278130
-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about … with minimum-savings rules (another widely-studied form of commitment), and how budgeting depends on the intensity of self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215309
the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an … equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our … results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189059
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189076
This paper studies the effect of timing and commitment of verification in a principal-agent relationship with moral … the time of contracting. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of commitment by the principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501886
-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500413
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753246
We study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers …. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs … of the induced balance between commitment and flexibility. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282919
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286976
We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894