We model the settlement of a legal dispute where the trial outcome depends on the behavior of a strategically motivated …. If the case goes to trial, the judge decides how much effort to exert to learn about the actual damages inflicted on the …

We model the settlement of a legal dispute where the trial outcome depends on the behavior of a strategically motivated …. If the case goes to trial, the judge decides how much effort to exert to learn about the actual damages inflicted on the …

show that, counterintuitively, litigation will occur only when the plaintiff is pessimistic about her prospects at trial …

show that, counterintuitively, litigation will occur only when the plaintiff is pessimistic about her prospects at trial …

We construct game theoretic foundations for bargaining in the shadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have … noisy signals of a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offers to settle. If the offers cross, they settle on … the average offer; otherwise, both litigants incur an additional cost and the judgment is imposed at trial. We obtain an …

) make the same demand and, since no types go to trial, private information is not revealed. Implementation of the loan may … financing, as it reduces their costs by eliminating the need to take the case to trial due to bargaining breakdown. We further …

We construct game theoretic foundations for bargaining in the shadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have … noisy signals of a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offers to settle. If the offers cross, they settle on … the average offer; otherwise, both litigants incur an additional cost and the judgment is imposed at trial. We obtain an …

or trial may turn into a disaster when the defendant goes bankrupt. Rainmakers face the following dilemma: the greater … the success in court, the greater the defendant's bankruptcy risk. The starting point of our paper is a simple trial and … Loss Insurance for both the settlement and the trial stage. We demonstrate that trial insurance and settlement insurance …

-liability settlement agreements; effects of legal aid; time-value to trial and optionality of news; the impact of the "Law of Costs …"; optimal trial cost applications and requests for "leave to appeal". Both familiar and paradoxical new results are confirmed by …