We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price...

We examine some policy issues pertaining to joint product development between domestic firms. We show that under a joint venture the probability of success is lower compared to that under competitive R&D. Moreover, the social surplus may also be lower under cooperative product development. These...

We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that in...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to build a theory of joint venture formation and instability based on synergy and monitoring. Design/methodology/approach – This problem is formulated as a dynamic game and solved using the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Findings – It was...

We examine the impact of changes in minimum wages regulation on unionized workers. The bargaining process between the management and the union is modeled as an alternating-offers bargaining game over employment and wage. We find that the equilibrium wage is equal to the minimum wages and that an...